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[[Abstract]] In this article, the authors assess the impact of firms’ offering a special form of 
phased retirement on their male employees’ labor market outcomes. The program aims at 
smoothing the transition from work to retirement and at decreasing costs in the public pension 
and unemployment insurance schemes through an increase in employment of elderly workers 
who otherwise would have exited prematurely through unemployment or early retirement. In 
line with these objectives, the authors assess whether male employees spend more time in 
employment and less time in unemployment or inactivity after the introduction of the 
program. The analysis is based on unique linked employer-employee data that combine high-
quality survey and administrative data. Results suggest that phased retirement options offered 
by firms can help to reduce some of the public costs of low labor force attachment of elderly 
workers, mainly by reducing exits through unemployment and by increasing employment and 
earnings. Under relatively good labor market conditions, however, they may also encourage a 
small share of workers to exit the labor market earlier. 
 
 
Low labor market attachment of the elderly has far-reaching consequences for the 
sustainability of the public welfare system in general and the pension system in particular, as 
well as important implications for future labor supply in aging societies. Despite increasing 
longevity, the average effective age at which older workers withdraw from the labor force has 
declined in almost all OECD countries since the 1970s (OECD 2009). Even though this trend 
has slightly reversed since the turn of the millennium, the effective retirement ages in all but 
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two OECD countries remain substantially lower than in the 1960s and 1970s. For Germany, 
which is the country we study, Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2011) reported that the labor force 
participation of elderly men aged 60 to 64 has dropped from more than 80% in 1966 to less 
than 35% in 1980s and 1990s. Since about the year 2000, the participation rate has been 
increasing again, arguably in response to a sequence of cost-cutting reforms after 1992, but it 
was still just over 40% in 2005. Also, female labor force participation in this age group 
dropped sharply in the 1970s and started to recover only in the mid-1990s, reaching 
approximately 25% in 2005. 
An increasing number of studies show that elderly workers are quite responsive to the 
relative attractiveness of different pathways toward retirement such as early retirement 
options, unemployment insurance (UI), and disability insurance (e.g., Staubli 2011; Staubli 
and Zweimüller 2013; Inderbitzin, Staubli, and Zweimüller 2013). We contribute to this 
literature by studying a special set of phased retirement options for workers aged 55 and older 
that Germany introduced in 1996 under the name of part-time work for elderly employees 
(henceforth PWE). Using this scheme, employers and employees can agree to reduce working 
time by half by choosing one of two options: a part-time work schedule during the entire 
PWE period or a full-time work schedule in the first half and a leave of absence in the second 
half of the PWE period (the so-called block model). During the entire PWE period, employers 
have to pay at least 50% of the gross wage. In our study period Germany's Federal 
Employment Agency (FEA) actively encouraged the use of PWE by providing a supplement 
payment if workers leaving the firm through PWE were replaced with unemployed or young 
job seekers. 
The objective of PWE is twofold. First, it aims at smoothing the transition from work 
to retirement by offering the option of gradual or early withdrawal from the labor market.
1
 
                                                          
1 Indeed, multiple surveys that have been conducted in various countries suggest that workers have an 
interest in reducing their working hours as they get older; see, for instance Abraham and Houseman 
(2004) and Drago, Wooden, and Black (2009). 
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Second, the aim is to decrease costs in the public pension and unemployment insurance 
schemes through an increase in the labor force attachment of elderly workers who otherwise 
would have withdrawn from work life completely through unemployment or early retirement. 
The political discussion of PWE has been highly controversial. Critics argue that the block 
model, which accounts for the vast majority of PWE agreements, is similar to "regular" early 
retirement schemes and encourages early exit (see the discussion in Brussig, Knuth, and 
Wojtkowski 2009), thus, in contrast to its initial intention, creating unjustifiable public costs 
through the supplement payments of the FEA. 
Motivated by the challenges of the negative effects of low labor market attachment of 
elderly workers in aging societies and the ambiguity of the merits of PWE in the political 
discussion, this article investigates the effects of the availability of PWE in German firms on 
the labor market outcomes of their male employees.
2
 In line with the objectives of PWE, we 
assess whether since the introduction of PWE employees spend more time in employment and 
less time in unemployment or inactivity. Our findings can therefore serve as inputs to a cost-
benefit analysis of PWE in terms of its public costs. Moreover, we analyze effect 
heterogeneity with respect to regions with different labor market conditions, as they may be 
important for the relative attractiveness of different potential pathways to retirement. 
Most of the existing literature has focused on studying the determinants of phased 
retirement (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier 1984; Honig and Hanoch 1985; Ruhm 1990; Hurd 
and McGarry 1993; Haider and Loughra 2001; Hutchens 2003; Even and Macpherson 2004; 
Hutchens and Grace-Martin 2006; Hutchens and Chen 2007; Robinson and Clark 2010). 
Comparatively few studies have investigated the effect of these schemes on exit strategies of 
                                                          
2 Note that the main text focuses on the results for males only because of econometric issues in the 
female sample that are outlined below in the Results section. The results for females are presented in 
the Internet appendix to this article at [[AU: Provide URL]].[[AU: Our publisher, SAGE Publications, 
can host the online material and make an active link in the online article that goes directly to the 
supplemental material. If you would like to make use of that service, I’ll add the website URL; if you 
would prefer to host the material on another website you have access to, that’s fine too—just let me 
know what that website address is. ANSWER FROM AU: The online material should be hosted by the 
publisher – thank you very much!]] 
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older workers. Using the 2006 Portuguese Labour Force Survey and a hazard model, 
Machado and Portela (2012), for example, investigated the effect of a voluntary reduction in 
hours of work on the timing of full retirement. The authors found that reductions are 
associated with earlier retirement in their data and concluded that reducing hours of work 
appears to signal the desire to retire sooner rather than to remain in the labor market (at 
reduced hours). 
Relative to the existing literature, we also make some methodological improvements. 
We exploit unique linked employer-employee data that combine high-quality survey and 
administrative data. These data allow us to follow individual labor market outcomes for up to 
6.5 years, such that both short- and longer-term effects can be assessed. Moreover, we use 
robust and relatively flexible semi-parametric econometric methods, which, in contrast to 
parametric estimators, do not rely on tight functional form assumptions likely to be violated in 
applications, and they allow for effect heterogeneity. Last, we explicitly address the selection 
problems involved in the estimation of the effects of PWE on workers’ labor market 
outcomes. We eliminate the potential problem that workers may self-select into firms offering 
PWE by focusing on firms that did not offer PWE by the middle of the year 2000 and by 
excluding workers who entered the firm less than three years prior to this time. Then, by 
conditioning on a rich set of firm, worker, and regional characteristics coming from various 
combined data sources, we account for the fact that some establishments introduced PWE 
between 2000 and 2002, while others did not. Finally, we exploit the panel structure of the 
data and take out time-constant unobserved factors as well as differential trends that may 
determine workers’ labor market outcomes or firms’ performance. Estimating the effects for a 
group of workers that should be unaffected by the introduction of PWE serves as a placebo 
test that supports our empirical strategy. 
[[AU: This paragraph is very similar to the concluding one on page 30. Is that 
intentional and okay? ANSWER: Yes, is ok from our side.]]Our results suggest that phased 
4 
retirement options offered by firms can help to reduce some of the public costs of low labor 
force attachment of older workers, mainly by reducing exits through unemployment. For the 
majority of workers, we find that the introduction of PWE increases employment and labor 
earnings and reduces unemployment of older workers, while leaving the time of complete 
withdrawal from the labor market unchanged. Hence, it benefits the government budget in 
terms of increased tax revenue and social insurance contributions as well as reduced 
unemployment insurance payments. A rough cost-benefit analysis suggests average net 
savings in public costs per worker in PWE of about 3,000 to 4,500 euros in West Germany 
and 4,500 to 7,000 euros in East Germany (depending on the assumptions about discounting). 
Under relatively good labor market conditions, however, there may also be some undesired 
effects. We find evidence that the availability of PWE encourages some workers to exit the 
labor market earlier than they would in the absence of PWE. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.  The next section provides 
background information on PWE in Germany. In the following section we describe our 
empirical strategy. After that we present descriptive statistics and balancing tests, followed by 
a discussion of the results. The final section concludes. An online appendix, available at 
[[AU: URL?]], provides further descriptive statistics and estimation results for both males and 
females.[[AU: This “previewing” paragraph isn’t necessary because the subheadings will 
guide readers through the material. Okay to delete? ANSWER: OK to delete, if this is what 
the journal prefers to do.]] 
 <H1>Background Information on Part-Time Employment for the Elderly 
in Germany 
 <H2>Institutional Background 
Minimum legal standards for phased retirement agreements were introduced in Germany in 
1996.
3
 These agreements can be used for workers aged 55 or older. There is no legal 
                                                          
3 Altersteilzeitgesetz (PWE Act). 
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requirement that employers provide PWE. The adoption of PWE is conditional on the 
employer’s decision to offer these options and formally requires consideration in the 
collective wage agreement (if applicable) or some form of internal agreement (Brussig et al. 
2009). Employees and employers can agree to reduce working time by half, choosing one of 
two options: a part-time work schedule during the entire PWE period or the so-called block 
model that comprises a full-time work schedule in the first half and a leave of absence in the 
second half. Corresponding to the reduction of working hours by half, employers have to pay 
at least 50% of the gross wage during the entire PWE period, but several collective wage 
agreements provide for higher wages, the average payment being 73% (S. Wanger 2009). 
During our observation period, Germany's Federal Employment Agency actively 
encouraged the use of PWE by providing a supplement payment if workers leaving the firm 
through PWE were replaced with unemployed workers or young job seekers.
4
 The supplement 
was granted for at most six years, even if the PWE agreement covered a longer period. The 
payment was a top-up of the employer’s payment by 20% of the pre-PWE gross salary, 
including single or irregular payments. Moreover, the FEA paid 90% of the worker’s 
compulsory pension contributions. The FEA subsidies were abolished at the end of 2009. 
<H2>Utilization of PWE 
As shown in Figure 1,[[Figure 1—given that the Journal style doesn’t number the 
subheadings/sections, we will renumber the figures and tables sequentially throughout the 
article]] the utilization of PWE increased steadily in the 10 years after its introduction in 
1996, reaching an annual average total of almost 530,000 employees in 2006. In the 
subsequent two years, PWE utilization remained quite stable. Almost one-fifth of employees 
subject to obligatory social security contributions aged 55 to 64 were in PWE in 2007 
(Brussig et al. 2009). In 2009, PWE experienced a sharp rise to more than 672,000 workers. 
This rise likely reflected a reaction to the great economic crisis or the anticipation of the 
                                                          
4 Smaller companies with up to 50 employees also received the subsidy if they hired apprentices. 
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abolishment of the FEA subsidies. In our observation period (2000–2008), the average age at 
which workers entered PWE was 57 for females and 58 for males. The average duration in 
PWE increased from three years in the early 2000s to somewhat more than four years at the 
end of the decade (S. Wanger 2009).
5
 
[[Figure 1 (Renumbered as Figure 1 and will continue numbering sequentially) near 
here]] 
Interestingly, only 15 to 20% of total PWE in any given period was supported by the 
FEA, suggesting that many employers, though they adopted PWE, preferred forgoing the 
FEA supplement payments at the benefit of remaining unconstrained in their hiring policies. 
After a continuous rise, the number of beneficiaries passed 100,000 in 2006 and has been 
declining slowly ever since 2008.
6
 The costs of FEA sponsoring were nevertheless far from 
negligible. Expenditures increased substantially after the PWE Act came into force, therefore 
causing much controversy in political and public debates in Germany. They climbed from just 
10.6 million euros in 1997 for 3,286 cases to a staggering 1.38 billion in 2007 when FEA-
sponsored PWE reached its peak (104,350 cases). 
Disentangling the two PWE models—namely, part-time work over the entire time 
frame versus the block model—reveals that the latter is by far the more popular option and 
has become more important over time. Already in 2005, 84.6% of all FEA-sponsored PWE 
agreements were based on the block model, and its share increased to 89.1% in 2008 and 
90.2% in 2011 (German Federal Employment Agency 2012). The predominance of the block 
model seems to be contrary to the initial political intention to truly smooth the work-
retirement transition rather than have separate periods of full and no employment. S. Wanger 
                                                          
5 Note that workers in PWE (or unemployed) have early access to regular retirement at the ages of 60 
to 63 (depending on their year of birth). Their retirement benefits will, however, be reduced to some 
extent because they left before the regular retirement age. 
6 Note that this number considers only cases that received FEA transfers in the respective year, 
irrespective of the total time frame of the PWE agreement. For the block model, this implies that the 
individuals  enter these statistics only during their leave of absence, that is in the second half of the 
PWE, as FEA payments start only after the full-time work phase. 
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(2009) noted, though, that it was both the employer and the employee organizations that 
demanded the introduction of the block model in the PWE Act. Arguably, it provides 
employers with a socially acceptable means to adjust their workforce and enables employees 
to retire early without large financial losses, which explains the popularity of PWE. 
<H2>Interactions with Other Retirement Options 
As in most countries, in Germany there exist different options for leaving the labor market 
before statutory retirement age. In the following we discuss the most important ones because 
they affect the relative attractiveness of PWE. First, workers could retire [[AU: Should 
discussion of these options be in the present tense since first sentence suggests they are still 
available? ANSWER: Yes]]early at age 60
7
 before statutory retirement age (65 for most 
workers in our observation period)
8
 under certain circumstances: 1) out of unemployment if 
they had been unemployed for at least 12 months after turning 58.5 years old, 2) out of PWE 
if they had spent at least 24 months in PWE, or 3) if they had contributed to the pension 
system for at least 35 years. Early retirement via unemployment or PWE, however, leads 
[[AU: Note present tense]]to penalties on the final pension of 0.3% for each month of 
retirement before statutory retirement age. As a consequence, it is attractive to use 
unemployment or PWE to be able to exit the labor market early and to use it for as long as 
possible in order to minimize pension penalties. 
Second, workers could leave [[AU: See query above—present tense? ANSWER: 
Yes]]the labor market through unemployment covered by unemployment insurance payments. 
Workers aged 55 or older with sufficiently long work histories were eligible for 18 to 32 
months of UI during our observation period (2000–2008). The time on UI counts as a 
                                                          
7 For male workers born in 1946 to 1948, the early retirement age increased by one month for each 
month born after 1945 until it reached 63 for cohorts born in 1949 to 1951. Early retirement options 1 
and 2 were abolished for cohorts born in 1952 or later. 
8 For females, the statutory retirement age was 60 for cohorts born before 1940. Thereafter, it was 
gradually increased by one month for each month born later until it also reached 65 for cohorts born in 
1945 or later. Moreover, for cohorts born in 1947 or later the statutory retirement age has been 
increased gradually to 67 for cohorts born in 1964 or later. 
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contribution period for the calculation of the pensions, although with a considerably lower 
value than regular employment. At 60% of the previous average after-tax salary, the UI 
replacement rate is usually comparable to the replacement rate of statutory pensions, thus 
providing strong incentives to use up UI before retiring early (with penalties on the statutory 
pension) or to use UI from an age at which it completely covers the time until statutory 
retirement age. Compared with UI, PWE has several advantages. First, it covers a 
considerably longer period than UI (on average three to four years). Second, it provides 
higher income—on average 73% of the previous gross salary (S. Wanger 2009). Finally, it 
counts as a contribution period for the calculation of pensions with a higher value than UI. 
Hence, from an individual perspective, PWE is the most attractive option for those who leave 
the labor market before statutory retirement age, followed by exit through UI and standard 
early retirement. 
<H1>Empirical Strategy 
<H2>Parameter of Interest and Basic Idea 
We are interested in the effects of a firm’s offering PWE compared with not offering PWE on 
the labor market outcomes of the firm’s employees. Specifically, we estimate the effect of the 
introduction of PWE in a firm rather than the use of PWE by its employees. Hence, we 
estimate a causal parameter similar to an intention-to-treat effect. By doing so, we avoid 
having to solve the selection problem associated with individual use of PWE, which would 
require more information than is available in our data.
9
 Moreover, the effect of introducing 
PWE at the firm level is interesting per se because this is the only thing that firms can influ-
ence directly. We focus on the so-called average treatment effect (ATE) of introducing PWE 
                                                          
9 Mainly on the basis of U.S. data, Gustman and Steinmeier (1984); Honig and Hanoch (1985); Ruhm 
(1990); Haider and Loughran (2001); Kim and DeVaney (2005); and Robinson and Clark (2010) 
identified the following determinants of utilization of phased retirement options: age, health, family 
status, pension coverage, mandatory retirement provisions, wages, education, expected social security 
income, nonwage income, self-employment, and labor force experience. Many of these variables, 
especially health and pension coverage as well as family status and self-employment, are unobserved 
in our data. 
9 
compared with not introducing it. This corresponds to the effect for an employee randomly 
drawn from our estimation sample.
10
 
To disentangle the effects of the introduction of PWE by employers from other 
determinants of the worker’s labor market outcomes, two selection problems remain. First, 
workers may self-select into firms that offer PWE. We solve this problem by focusing on 
firms that did not offer PWE in mid-2000 and by considering only workers who had been 
with the firm for at least three years by mid-2000. Hence, all workers included in the analysis 
joined their firms at a time when they did not offer PWE and when it was not foreseeable that 
they might offer PWE in the future. The second selection problem arises because firms 
selectively rather than randomly introduced PWE between mid-2000 and mid-2002. To solve 
this problem, we first exploit exceptionally informative linked employer-employee data using 
matching techniques. Second, we exploit the panel structure of the data and take out time-
constant unobserved factors as well as differential trends that may determine firm 
performance or workers’ labor market outcomes. 
<H2>Data 
Our empirical analysis relies on unique linked employer-employee data that combine different 
administrative and survey data from the Federal Employment Agency's Institute of 
Employment Research (IAB). The data come from the IAB Establishment Panel (IAB-EP), 
which is a representative survey of German establishments
11
 and covers a broad spectrum of 
firm-level information. The survey was first conducted in 1993 and is annually repeated. It is 
an unbalanced panel as a result of attrition and the inclusion of new companies over time.  
The information from the IAB-EP was merged with that from the so-called IAB 
Establishment History Panel, which includes a rich set of aggregate information on the firm’s 
                                                          
10 Our empirical strategy also allows estimating effects for the group of (non)treated employees, that 
is, for those actually working in establishments with or without PWE. They are available from the 
authors upon request. In general, they are comparable but considerably less precisely estimated. 
11 An establishment either is a single firm or comprises all branches of a larger firm within the same 
relatively narrowly defined region and industry. In the following, we will use the terms 
“establishment” and “firm” interchangeably. 
10 
employees. This information is based on the employees’ social insurance records and is 
constructed, for each year, from the cross section of all workers employed in the firm on June 
30. It describes the size and the composition of a firm’s workforce—for example, in terms of 
age, education, tenure, and earnings—as well as the flows of workers into and out of the firm 
from one year to the next. 
For the firms in our sample, which are described in more detail below, the social 
insurance records of their employees for the years 1990 to 2008 have been merged with the 
firm data. They comprise full employment, unemployment, and earnings histories, as well as 
a rich set of personal characteristics for all workers employed by the firms in our data on June 
30, 2000.
12
 Finally, the data also contain a rich set of regional characteristics such as the 
federal state, urbanization, and local labor market conditions, which have been merged by 
means of county identifiers from regional statistics. 
<H2>Definition and Measurement of the Treatment 
For identification, we focus on estimating the effects of the introduction of PWE between 
2000 and 2002. Information about PWE comes from two sources. First, the 1999 and 2002 
waves of the firm survey include a question as to whether the firm offers PWE. Second, the 
social insurance records of the employees indicate whether there is any worker on a PWE 
contract. Our baseline sample consists of firms that did not offer PWE in 1999 and 2000 
(measured in the 1999 survey and the administrative data from 1999 and 2000).  
“Treatment” status is defined on the basis of the availability of PWE in 2002: The 
treated pool consists of all firms that have switched to offering PWE (according to the survey 
data), while those not offering PWE in 2002 (according to both the survey data and the 
administrative data) constitute the nontreated sample. The very few firms for which PWE is 
                                                          
12 The social insurance records were also used, for example, by Wunsch and Lechner (2008), Biewen, 
Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Paul (2014), Wunsch (2013), and Lechner and Wunsch (2013) but with 
a different sampling design. 
11 
offered according to the administrative data but not according to the survey data are 
discarded.  
We do not distinguish between the two types of PWE—the block model and the part-
time model—as we did not observe this distinction in the data. Workers in both models 
remain registered as employed in the firm for the full PWE period. In particular, workers in 
the block model remain registered as employed during their leave of absence. Hence, both 
types of workers look the same in that respect in our data. Moreover, as pointed out above, the 
vast majority of workers choose the block model (85–90%). Thus the treatment we consider is 
dominated by the block model. 
<H2>Sample Selection 
Our empirical analysis is based on a subsample of the establishments included in the IAB-EP 
in 2000. For this project, we had access to a linked employer-employee data set that covers 
2,980 of the 13,931 establishments in the 2000 wave of the IAB-EP. Excluded are 
establishments with fewer than 100 employees (about 72% of the total sample), the 25 largest 
firms, and firms in the agriculture, foresting, mining, energy, transportation, messaging, 
education, and social insurance sectors (about 20% of the total sample).
13
 Thus the sample is 
restricted to private companies that are representative for firms in the manufacturing and 
service sectors.
14
 For the firms in this sample, we observe the administrative records of about 
1.4 million workers employed by these firms in June 2000.  
In the following, we describe how we selected firms and workers from this sample in 
order to ensure identification of the effect of introducing PWE. The effects on sample size and 
sample composition are documented in Table A.1 in Appendix A and discussed below. In 
what follows we focus on males only, while the descriptive statistics and estimation results 
                                                          
13 The percentages provided here and below refer to the original sample of 13,931 firms. Hence several 
firms satisfy multiple sample restriction criteria. 
14 This article is part of a larger cooperation project with the IAB that focused on intra-firm 
comparisons of workers in the private manufacturing and service sectors. The former required a 
sufficiently large number of employees per firm. For the latter, sectors with large public shares in the 
past [[AU: Unclear]]were excluded as well. 
12 
for females are presented in the Internet appendix.[[AU: Provide Internet address in a 
footnote. ANSWER: Pls do so.]] This is due to econometric issues in the female sample that 
are outlined in detail below. 
First, to measure the treatment we need to observe firms in the 1999 and 2002 waves 
of the survey (see the preceding subsection). Because of relatively high attrition rates in the 
IAB-EP and a small amount of item nonresponse in the relevant question about PWE, the 
original worker-firm sample is reduced by 28%. The sample composition remains very 
similar, however, suggesting that attrition is nonsystematic. Second, as we focus on 
estimating the effects of the introduction of PWE after 2000, our sample consists only of 
firms that did not offer PWE in 1999 and 2000, which reduces the worker-firm sample by 
another 85%. At this stage, selectivity in the introduction of PWE by firms becomes visible: 
Firms using PWE already in the baseline period are larger on average than nonusers and are 
concentrated in the service sector with relatively high shares of clerks and workers in higher-
skilled occupations. In line with this, average earnings in the remaining firms are also lower. 
Other than that, however, the sample composition is again very similar to that in the original 
sample. 
Third, as regards the workers in our sample, we consider only workers aged 31 to 60 
(in June 2000). This condition ensures that workers are sufficiently distant from educational 
choices and statutory retirement age (65). Moreover, as mentioned above, we exclude workers 
with less than three years of tenure in June 2000. This ensures that the workers we study did 
not self-select into firms that offer PWE because they joined the firms at a time when the 
firms did not offer and it was not foreseeable that they would offer PWE. Additionally, we 
exclude a small number of West German workers who had not been employed for all of the 
last 10 years before June 2000. This is done to ensure common support between firms with 
and without PWE, as this variable almost perfectly predicts whether firms offer PWE. 
Therefore, firms with and without PWE cannot be made comparable with respect to this 
13 
characteristic. In total, the three criteria together reduce the sample by 44%. In terms of 
sample composition, this (by construction) increases the average age of workers and in line 
with that, average earnings and the share of workers in the manufacturing sector.
15
 It also 
increases (again by construction because of higher average tenure and the restriction on em-
ployment histories for West German workers) the average fraction of time employed in the 
last 10 years. Otherwise, the sample composition is again similar. 
Again to avoid common support problems, we exclude firms with more than 1,000 
employees in the year 2000, East German firms in the construction sector, and firms that 
neither have  a collective wage agreement nor tie pay to collective agreements, as these 
characteristics almost perfectly predict whether firms offer PWE. Because we exclude large 
firms, this reduces the number of workers by another 54%. Except for average firm size, 
however, the composition of the sample is largely unaffected. 
In summary, because of the selection steps we impose for the sake of identification, 
the effects we estimate generalize to the average worker and firm in the linked employer-
employee data in many but not all dimensions: Firms in the estimation sample are smaller, 
more concentrated in the manufacturing sector, and less concentrated in service sectors that 
use more skilled labor. Workers in the relevant age group have larger average tenure and 
therefore somewhat more favorable employment histories as well as somewhat higher average 
skill and education levels but are less concentrated in clerks because of the differences in 
firms’ sectors. This is important to keep in mind for the interpretation of our results. 
We conduct our evaluation within six distinct strata. The resulting sample sizes of 
firms and (male) workers for each stratum and treatment are displayed in Table 1. We 
distinguish between East and West Germany because the incentives of firms to offer PWE 
might differ according to distinct labor market conditions in these two regions. In particular, 
                                                          
15 Because of the structural change from the manufacturing to the service sector taking place in 
Germany and most other industrialized countries, older workers are concentrated in the former while 
younger workers, an over-proportional share of whom we exclude, are concentrated in the latter. 
14 
the labor market conditions in West Germany are much more favorable than those in East 
Germany. As we show in the section below on descriptive statistics, the firms operating in the 
two markets are different, which implies that selection into PWE might be distinct. By 
estimating the effects separately for the two regions, we allow for maximum flexibility in the 
selection correction part of the estimation. On the other hand, labor market conditions affect 
earnings and unemployment insurance claims, which in turn may influence the relative 
attractiveness of different pathways toward retirement. Hence there is also reason to believe 
that the effects of offering PWE might differ between East and West Germany. 
[[Table 1 (Table 1, and continue to number sequentially) near here]] 
Furthermore, we split the sample into three age groups (31–40, 41–50, and 51–60). As 
eligibility for PWE starts at age 55, direct effects of PWE should be visible in the oldest 
group, aged 51 to 60. We also include 51- to 54-year-olds because all of them became eligible 
for PWE during the 6.5-year period for which we measure outcomes. Moreover, focusing on 
55- to 60-year-olds would almost halve the sample size of the most relevant group, thus 
leading to imprecise estimates. The intermediate age group (41–50) mainly serves to measure 
potential spillover effects on workers who are not yet eligible
16
 but are sufficiently close to 
the ages at which early retirement decisions become relevant. For example, firms that 
introduce PWE may be more attractive to these middle-aged workers, who may increase 
tenure with the firm. The youngest age group (31–40) allows us to validate our identification 
strategy because it should be unaffected by the introduction of PWE. These workers are too 
young for early retirement decisions to become relevant. Moreover, because we require for 
identification that all workers in our sample be already employed in the firm prior to the 
introduction of PWE, they cannot be affected by the hiring of replacements for workers who 
leave the firm through PWE. 
                                                          
16 Only a negligible fraction of this age group becomes eligible for PWE toward the end of the 6.5-year 
posttreatment observation period (see also Figure 2). 
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<H2>Outcome Variables 
The individual administrative records allow computing a large number of outcome variables 
that measure different dimensions of employees’ labor market performance for 6.5 years from 
July 2002 to December 2008. With the exception of tenure, they are measured in the second 
half
17
 of June or December of a given year in two different ways: as binary labor market 
status indicators or income measures for that particular period (so-called point-in-time 
estimates) and as months in a given labor market status or income from a given source 
accumulated since July 2002 (so-called cumulated effects). We present the results for selected 
outcomes that seem to be most interesting. We start by investigating the use of PWE by 
employees to assess whether it is used in any quantitatively important way such that effects 
can be expected. We then analyze various individual labor market outcomes. First and in line 
with the main objective of introducing PWE, we investigate whether PWE increases the labor 
market attachment of older workers by increasing employment. Second, we assess potential 
public cost savings in terms of higher tax revenue and social insurance contributions by 
looking at labor earnings. Third, we investigate the effects on the time spent in 
unemployment. On the one hand, this provides information about potential savings in 
unemployment insurance payments. On the other hand, it is informative about exits from the 
labor market through unemployment. The reason is that only 11% of East German workers 
and 10.4% of West German workers in the oldest age group who enter unemployment in the 
6.5 years for which we observe outcomes are employed at the end of the observation window, 
which is beyond or close to statutory retirement age for most workers in this group. Fourth, 
we investigate whether PWE reduces or increases the total time spent out of the labor force, 
which is informative about whether PWE leads to delayed exits from the labor market or 
encourages early exits, as found by Machado and Portela (2012). This is because only 9% of 
East German workers and 12% of West German workers who enter inactivity in the 6.5-year 
                                                          
17 To determine a unique labor market status for each period, the administrative records have been 
arranged as a panel data set with one observation for each half of a month in the period 1990 to 2008. 
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outcome period are employed at the end of the observation window. Finally, we complete the 
picture by assessing potential returns to the firms directly: we analyze whether workers spend 
a longer time in the firms that offer PWE by looking at the effects on tenure. 
Given that we address self-selection by workers into firms by focusing on workers 
with sufficiently long pretreatment tenure, the following discussion focuses on the issue of 
selective introduction of PWE by firms. Theoretical considerations suggest that firms’ 
decisions to introduce PWE should be both employer- and employee-driven. On the one hand, 
PWE should be attractive for employers that want to downsize, rejuvenate, or otherwise 
restructure their workforce because the only alternative would be to lay off workers. This, 
however, would be very costly, especially for older employees with long tenure because these 
workers are protected by long notification periods and eligibility for generous severance 
payments. Moreover, German law makes it difficult to lay off workers for economic reasons. 
Even in cases for which this is possible, workers with short tenure and young workers without 
children must be laid off first. Whether firms want to downsize or restructure their workforce 
should be related to the economic conditions in the region and the industry of the firm, to firm 
size as well as to firm performance. Moreover, firms with physically more demanding jobs 
and a larger share of older workers should be more likely to offer PWE. The same is true for 
firms with a high incidence of health problems in their workforce because this is strongly 
correlated with age. Furthermore, it is easier for larger firms to accommodate PWE because 
they are more flexible in terms of the ability to offer part-time work and job sharing. Finally, 
because costs of corporate pension plans are more dependent on tenure than on individual 
salaries, employers may be less likely to introduce PWE if they offer such plans, depending 
on their tenure structure. From the employees’ perspective, introduction of PWE is always 
desirable as it is the most attractive option for an employee who decides to leave the labor 
market before statutory retirement age. Hence it is more likely if there is strong worker 
representation in the firm—for example, through union coverage or a works council, which is 
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more likely the larger the firm is. Moreover, physically more demanding jobs and a larger 
share of older workers also raise interest in introducing PWE from the workers’ point of view. 
Local labor market conditions also affect the attractiveness of PWE because being laid off 
might be the alternative. Last, workers may be more interested in PWE if they have accu-
mulated sufficient financial means to be able to afford reductions of working hours or early 
exit from the labor market. 
Several empirical studies confirm the importance of these factors. Hutchens and 
Grace-Martin (2006) concluded on the basis of the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
that phased retirement is more likely available in firms with flexible work hours, part-time 
employment, and job sharing.
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 This is in line with Hurd and McGarry (1993), who found that 
particular job characteristics such as the flexibility to reduce hours or move to a less 
demanding job increase the prospective retirement age.
19
 Again using the HRS, Even and 
Macpherson (2004) considered both firm- and individual-level selection into phased 
retirement. Their results suggest that firms providing pension plans are less willing to allow 
workers to cut hours and that (in line with the studies mentioned above) pension-covered 
workers are less likely to switch to part-time employment and more likely to switch to full 
retirement. The latter is true even conditional on the original employer’s willingness to allow 
for a reduction in work hours as well as on various firm and worker characteristics. Hutchens 
and Chen (2007) combined the HRS with a representative U.S. employer survey conducted in 
2001 and 2002 and confirmed previous findings that the opportunity of phased retirement 
depends on both employer and employee characteristics (e.g., whether the company is public 
or private, workers’ age, defined benefit pension plans, and unionization). Furthermore, 
Hutchens (2003) found that firm size and growth, as well as the composition of the workforce 
                                                          
18 See also Hutchens (2010), who used the same survey to investigate which types of employees have 
particularly good chances of being considered for phased retirement in firms offering it at all. 
19 Pensions and health care insurance are further important predictors of prospective retirement, in 
contrast to physical and mental job requirements.  
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in terms of age, gender, and tenure, is correlated with the likelihood of offering phased 
retirement. 
Table 2 summarizes the factors identified above from the theoretical considerations 
and the empirical literature and indicates how we can capture them with our data. There is 
only one factor we cannot capture, namely, corporate pension plans. This is largely negligible, 
however, because in Germany the vast majority of pensions come from public pension 
insurance. With 6–8% for German females and 1–3% for men in East Germany, the share of 
recipients of corporate pension plans is extremely low during our observation period. Only for 
West German men is this share higher, with about 30% (BMAS 2012). Even for most of these 
workers, however, the largest share of retirement income comes  from the public pension 
system (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2004). Only in some occupations do corporate pensions 
play a somewhat more important role. For example, they are concentrated in industries such 
as banking and finance. Hence we capture this by including industry and occupations 
dummies. Furthermore, corporate pensions are highly correlated with tenure and earnings, and 
we observe both the distribution of tenure and earnings in the firm and workers’ tenure and 
earnings directly. Hence we are able to capture important aspects of corporate pensions for the 
cases in which they might be somewhat more important. 
 
[[Table 3.2 (Table 2) near here]] 
Nevertheless, to address the issue of any potentially remaining unobserved factors and 
possible trends that differentially drive labor market outcomes of treated and untreated 
workers, we additionally exploit the panel structure of the data, which allows us to observe 
detailed pretreatment labor market outcomes for all workers in our sample. Specifically, we 
are able to condition on a variety of summary measures of the workers’ labor market 
performance over the 10 years prior to treatment. Hence we can take out not only any time-
constant unobserved factors (fixed effects) that drive labor market outcomes but also any 
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differential long-term trends because we can essentially equalize workers in terms of all kinds 
of dimensions of labor market performance over the 10 years prior to mid-2000. Moreover, 
note that we are also able to measure time trends in firm performance, which may differ 
between treated and untreated firms because we observe firm growth, changes in revenue, 
investments, and turnover. The exact specification we use for selection correction is described 
in the next section and summarized in the last column of Table 2. 
Finally, as mentioned above, we use the youngest group of workers, aged 31 to 40, to 
validate the identification strategy. They should be unaffected by the introduction of PWE 
because they are sufficiently far away from ages at which early retirement decisions become 
relevant and because they were already employed in the firm prior to the introduction of 
PWE. Hence they should be unaffected by hiring replacements for workers who leave the firm 
through PWE. Consequently, estimating the effects of the introduction of PWE for younger 
workers provides a placebo-type test by which a negligible and insignificant effect supports 
our identification strategy. 
<H2>Estimation 
Any estimator that eliminates selection bias based on observed factors is built on the idea of 
comparing outcomes across units with and without treatment that are similar with respect to 
observed confounders in order to pin down the causal effect of the treatment. Instead of using 
parametric OLS, we use a propensity-score-matching estimator that defines similarity in terms 
of a function of the probability to be treated conditional on the confounders. In the program 
evaluation literature, this conditional probability is referred to as the propensity score (see 
Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). An advantage of these estimators is that they are semi-
parametric and therefore more robust than parametric methods like OLS and that they allow 
for flexible effect heterogeneity.  
Among many possible matching estimators, we chose radius matching on the 
propensity score with regression adjustment as suggested in Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch 
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(2011) to estimate the average effect of the introduction of PWE. This estimator has several 
attractive features. It is more precise than nearest neighbor matching (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba 
2002). It remains consistent if either the matching step is based on a correctly specified 
propensity score model or the regression model is correctly specified (so-called double 
robustness property; see, e.g., Rubin 1979; Joffe, Have, Feldman, and Kimmel 2004). It 
reduces small sample as well as asymptotic biases of matching (Abadie and Imbens 2006), 
and it performs well in finite samples (Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch 2013) but without having 
to rely on functional form assumptions. The different steps involved in this particular 
estimator are described in Table E.1 in Appendix E. 
The propensity scores needed for selection correction are estimated with separate 
probit models for each stratum. The dependent variable in each subsample is zero for workers 
in firms that do not offer PWE in 2002 and one otherwise. All probit models and their results 
are presented in Appendix B (men) and the online appendix (women). The specifications 
result from the identification issues discussed above as well as extensive specification tests for 
normality, heteroscedasticity, and in particular omitted variables. The data contain hundreds 
of variables, a lot of them being highly correlated. We started with a parsimonious 
specification that included the most important potential confounders according to the 
empirical literature and theoretical considerations summarized in Table 2. On the basis of 
omitted variables tests for all variables in the data, we sequentially added variables if 
suggested by the test statistics.  
To capture the main incentives of firms to introduce PWE, the final specifications 
include firm size, industry, and the composition of the firm’s workforce in terms of age and 
education, as well as several measures of restructuring activities, organizational factors, 
human resource policies, flexible work arrangements, and health problems within the firm. 
We also control for potentially differential trends for firms by including a measure of changes 
in firm performance. Local labor market conditions are measured using region dummies, local 
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unemployment rates, and rural/urban dummies. An indicator for pay’s being tied to a 
collective wage agreement likely captures the strength of worker representation to a certain 
extent. Furthermore, we include age, foreigner status, education, occupation, tenure, and five 
measures of different dimensions of past labor market performance as individual determinants 
of labor market outcomes and to capture potentially unobserved individual factors as well as 
potentially different trends in labor market performance. Finally, current earnings and the sum 
of earnings accumulated in the last 10 years capture the financial situation of employees.  
On the basis of the estimated propensity scores, we ensure overlap of the distributions 
of the covariates in the treated and nontreated samples by excluding treated individuals with 
scores higher than the maximum among the nontreated and, similarly, nontreated individuals 
with scores that are lower than the minimum among the treated. We document the loss of 
observations and the changes in the sample due to the impositionof common support in Tables 
C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C. For five out of six strata, we exclude fewer than 10% of workers, 
and for younger workers in East Germany we exclude 13%, in all cases with negligible effects 
on sample composition. 
<H2>Inference 
P-values for t-statistics to test whether the estimated effects are different from zero are 
obtained from a block bootstrap that resamples establishments (rather than individuals) along 
with all employees therein to account for clustering at the establishment level.
20
 We use 499 
bootstrap replications and compute the bootstrap t-statistics of the respective average effects 
in each of the samples (normalized by the estimated effect). We then estimate the p-value as 
                                                          
20 Abadie and Imbens (2008) showed that for standard matching (based on a fixed number of 
comparison observations) bootstrap-based inference may be invalid. However, our matching algorithm 
is smoother than the one they studied because it uses a variable number of comparisons and a 
regression adjustment. For this reason, the bootstrap is most likely a valid inference procedure in our 
context. 
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<H1>Descriptive Statistics and Balancing Tests 
This section presents descriptive statistics for the key group of elderly male workers (aged 
51–60) and their employers. In Table 3,[[Table 3]] we present characteristics of the firms in 
which the elderly workers were employed in June 2000, separately by PWE status, gender, 
and region. Table 4[[Table 4]] displays the characteristics of male employees in those 
groups.
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 We report the mean characteristics by treatment status as well as their difference 
before and after matching. The latter shows how well our approach succeeds in eliminating 
selection bias, especially since most of the variables in the tables are not included in the 
estimation of the propensity score (see Table 2, and Appendix B). 
[[Table 4.1 (Table 3) near here]] 
Table 3 shows that the introduction of PWE is selective with respect to a range of firm 
characteristics. Establishments providing PWE on average perform better than those that do 
not: they are substantially larger, pay higher wages, and have increasing revenues and a 
higher rate of capital investments. Moreover, they differ considerably from non-providers of 
PWE in terms of the distribution of industries and organizational characteristics. Foreign-
                                                          
21 See, for instance, MacKinnon( 2006) for a discussion of bootstrapping symmetric statistics. Since 
the theoretical results by Abadie and Imbens (2006) and the simulation-based results in Huber, 
Lechner, and Wunsch (2013) suggest that the estimator is asymptotically normally distributed, 
bootstrapping the potentially pivotal t-statistic (computed under the assumption that the weights 
obtained to compute the control group are non-stochastic) has the advantage of potentially providing 
so-called asymptotic refinements and thus improving inference. We also checked the bootstrap 
distribution of the estimated effects directly (quantile method). The results are similar (available on 
request). 
22 Information on the younger groups that are also considered in the econometric analysis (aged 41–50 
and 31–40) is available from the authors on request. Also, because of the very large number of 
variables in the data (several hundred) we abstain from presenting statistics on all variables. They are 
available on request. The information available in administrative data is well documented in Wunsch 
and Lechner (2008) and Lechner and Wunsch (2013). For a detailed documentation of the variables 
available in the IAB Establishment Panel see Accessed at 
http://fdz.iab.de/de/FDZ_Establishment_Data/IAB_Establishment_Panel/IAB_Establishment_Panel_
Working_Tools.aspx, for those in the IAB Establishment History Panel see 
http://fdz.iab.de/de/FDZ_Establishment_Data/Establishment_History_Panel/Establishment_History_P
anel_Working_Tools.aspx ([[AU: approximate access date?]]. ANSWER: Pls see references). 
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owned firms or companies that tie wages to a collective agreement are less likely to offer 
PWE, while firms with profit-sharing arrangements are more likely to do so. The incidence of 
recent corporate reorganizations is also related to the treatment but in opposite directions for 
West and East Germany. A further important dimension concerns staff-related issues such as 
difficulties in hiring or retaining employees, because PWE could potentially be used to 
alleviate such problems. The data suggest that firms that report searching for employees and 
having trouble finding skilled personnel are more likely to offer PWE, arguably to prevent 
experienced elderly employees from leaving the firm too early. Interesting differences 
between East and West German firms underline the importance of looking separately at the 
two regions. The most pronounced differences occur with respect to average skill levels, 
turnover, and foreign ownership. 
Table 4 shows the average characteristics of the employees aged 51 to 60 who are part 
of our estimation sample. The differences in earnings and occupations mirror those on the 
firm level displayed in Table 3. In all other dimensions, the differences between workers in 
firms that offer PWE and those that do not are rather small. Most important, the labor market 
performance of the firm’s employees prior to the potential introduction of PWE is very 
similar and hence seems to be unrelated to this event. This suggests that by limiting our sam-
ple to workers with at least three years of tenure in the studied firms before potential 
treatment, we largely succeeded in eliminating bias due to self-selection of workers into firms. 
[[Table 4.2 (Table 4) near here]] 
Tables 3 and 4 also show that applying the matching estimator outlined above (on the 
common support) results in very satisfactory balancing of the covariate distributions across 
treated and untreated establishments. None of the differences in mean firm and worker 
characteristics is significant after matching. Moreover, for important firm characteristics with 
large differences before matching, balancing could be improved considerably—for example, 
for the sectorial distribution of firms as well as organizational and human resource factors. 
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Maybe most important, firm size, growth, and capital investments are well balanced after 
matching, ensuring that firms are not subject to differential trends in firm performance. 
<H1>Results 
In the following, we present only the results for men because the results for women failed the 
placebo test of the introduction of PWE on younger workers. The main explanation is a 
balancing problem that we cannot solve because of sample size issues. As evident from Table 
IA.3 in the Internet appendix, higher-skilled service occupations were strongly 
overrepresented among females in firms that offer PWE. Closer inspection revealed that this 
mainly concerns specific occupations in the health sector such as nurses and midwifes. 
Unfortunately, although there is very detailed three-digit occupation information in the data, 
we cannot include it in the probit estimation in sufficient detail to remove selection in that 
particular respect because of sample size issues. The alternative would be to exclude all 
women with occupations that we cannot balance. This, however, results in rather small 
sample sizes, which is why we decided to abstain from discussing the results for women 
altogether. They are available in the Internet appendix. Men present no such problems.[[AU: 
We can add a footnote here reminding authors what the website address is, once we have that 
info. ANSWER: YES]]  
<H2>Utilization of PWE  
The first question of interest is to what extent PWE is actually utilized if available in a firm. 
Figure 2 plots the estimated average effects of PWE availability on the cumulative utilization 
of PWE, separately for the three age groups. The effects are measured in months and half-
yearly from mid-2002 to the end of 2008. As expected, none of the ineligible youngest 
workers use PWE. Moreover, workers aged 41 to 50 start to use PWE after four years when 
the first workers turn 55, but the total number is negligible, even at the end of the observation 
period (also see Table D.1 in Appendix D). This is in line with the fact that the average age of 
entering PWE is 58 (Wanger 2009). For the oldest age group, PWE use is statistically 
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significant on the 5% level at any point in time, as indicated by the superimposed round dots 
on the lines that represent the effects. About 6% of this age group use PWE (see Table D.1 in 
Appendix D), which results in the accumulation of on average of about 9 months of PWE 
over the 6.5-year posttreatment observation period. 
[[Figure 5.1 (Figure 2) near here]] 
<H2>Labor Market Outcomes 
Figures 3 to 6 show the cumulated effects for different labor market outcomes in a fashion 
similar to that in Figure 2. The point-in-time estimates are reported in Table D.1 in Appendix 
D. First, we investigate whether PWE increases the labor market attachment of older workers 
by increasing employment (Figure 3). Second, we assess potential public cost savings in 
terms of higher tax revenue and social insurance contributions by looking at labor earnings 
(Figure 4), and in terms of lower unemployment insurance payments by looking at 
unemployment (Figure 5). As discussed above, the latter is also informative about exits from 
the labor market via unemployment. We also investigate whether PWE reduces or increases 
the total time spent out of the labor force (Figure 6). This is informative about whether PWE 
leads to delayed exits from the labor market or instead encourages early exits as found by 
Machado and Portela (2012). Finally, we complete the picture by assessing whether workers 
spend more time with firms that offer PWE (Table 5). 
Before we discuss the results in detail, we check the validity of our identification 
strategy by looking at the effects for the youngest age group, which should be unaffected by 
the introduction of PWE. Indeed, we find quantitatively negligible and usually statistically 
insignificant effects for all outcomes. Hence, for men, our identification strategy appears to 
have successfully removed selection bias associated with the introduction of PWE. In the 
following, we discuss the results for the oldest group of workers, which is directly affected by 
the introduction of PWE. The first thing to note is that there is interesting heterogeneity in the 
effects when we compare East and West Germany, despite similar utilization rates of PWE. 
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The main difference between the two parts of Germany is that labor market conditions are 
much more favorable in the West than in the East. 
[[Figure 5.2 (Figure 3) near here]] 
For older employees in East Germany, the introduction of PWE significantly increases 
employment and thus labor earnings while at the same time reducing unemployment. 
Employment rates increase significantly by five to six percentage points throughout the 
observation period, which corresponds to the utilization rate of PWE. Unemployment rates 
fall significantly and almost to the same extent by four to five percentage points throughout 
the observation period (see Table D.1 in Appendix D). In total, older workers in East German 
firms that offer PWE accumulate on average about seven months of employment (Figure 3) in 
the same firm (Table 5) and 8,000 euros more in labor earnings (Figure 4) than in firms 
without PWE while experiencing about six months less of unemployment (Figure 5). 
However, the cumulative time spent out of the labor force remains unaffected (Figure 6). 
Hence we find no evidence for undesired effects of PWE in terms of an increased number of 
early exits from the labor market for East Germany. Instead, we find that PWE reduces the 
number of exits through unemployment, which implies notable public cost savings through 
reduced unemployment insurance payments
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 and increased revenue though income taxes and 
social security contributions. There are no savings in terms of pension insurance payments, 
though, because the time when workers leave the labor market remains unaffected. 
[[Figure 5.3 (Figure 4) near here]] 
For West Germany, the picture is more diverse with interesting differences between 
older workers who use PWE shortly after its introduction and those who make use of this 
offer only later in the observation period (see the point-in-time estimates in Table D.1 in 
Appendix D). For the first group, the effects are similar to the ones for East Germany. During 
the first two years after the introduction of PWE we find significantly higher employment 
                                                          
23 All workers in our sample qualify for unemployment insurance benefits because of the tenure 
requirement we impose for identification. 
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rates that correspond to the use rate of PWE, similar reductions in unemployment rates, and 
no effects on the share of workers out of the labor force. Three to four years after the 
introduction of PWE, however, positive employment effects and effects on unemployment 
quickly vanish while we start to see significantly positive effects on the share of workers out 
of the labor force. Hence from this point we find evidence for undesired effects of PWE in 
terms of an increased number of early exits from the labor market for West Germany. 
[[Figure 5 (Figure 5) near here]] 
 [[Figure 6 (Figure 6) near here]] 
In terms of cumulative effects, the differential effects for West German workers result 
in small positive but not significant effects on employment, a significant reduction in 
cumulated months unemployed of about four months—which does not increase further after 
four years—and a significant increase in the time out of the labor force of two months, which 
is reached after four years when there are no further effects on employment or unemployment. 
Table 5 additionally reveals that the differential effects in employment lead to no visible aver-
age effects on tenure in the firm. The effects on cumulated labor earnings in Figure 4 are 
positive and significant despite much smaller employment effects. The reason is that West 
German workers earn considerably more than East German workers (see Table 4). 
[[Table 5.1 (Table 5) near here]] 
As a last step, we look at potential spillover effects on middle-aged workers (41–50). 
Overall, we do not find any quantitatively important effects for this age group.  Some very 
weak evidence, if any, suggests that East German firms increase employment of older workers 
by somewhat reducing employment of workers aged 41 to 50. The employment effects are not 
statistically significant, but there is a small significant increase in cumulated unemployment 




On the basis of the estimated effects on cumulated earnings, unemployment, and time out of 
the labor force, it is possible to conduct a rough cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of 
the government. Several additional inputs and assumptions are required, however. They are 
summarized in Table 6. First, we use 40% to approximate average deductions for taxes and 
social insurance contributions, which is reasonable given the average gross earnings of 
workers in firms offering PWE reported in Table 4. Second, we need average monthly 
unemployment benefit payments. Because of the tenure requirement, all workers in our 
sample are eligible for UI. We assume that workers would have received UI during the entire 
estimated difference in months in unemployment. We approximate average monthly UI 
payments by applying the replacement rate of 60% to the average net earnings of workers in 
firms offering PWE. Third, we assume that the workers who were not employed at the end of 
the observation period after entering inactivity have entered the pension system. Hence, the 
difference in cumulated time out of the labor force is evaluated at the average monthly 
pension benefit for the share of workers who have not returned to employment. For the 
pension benefits, we apply a replacement rate of 55% to the average net earnings of workers 
in firms offering PWE. We chose a lower replacement rate than for UI because the workers 
will face penalties on their statutory pensions. Finally, we approximate expenditures on FEA-
sponsored PWE by combining the average share of workers supported over the period 2002 to 
2008, calculated from the numbers underlying Figure 1, with average expenditures per 
supported worker reported in Wanger (2009). 
[[Table 5.2 (Table 6) near here]] 
The results of these calculations are displayed in Table 7. We report costs, benefits, 
and net savings both without discounting and assuming a discount factor of 0.97 and 0.95 per 
annum to show how results change with different assumptions about discounting. We find 
that even with a discount factor of 0.95 there are net savings for the government: Over our 
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6.5-year observation period for outputs, the net gain per worker amounts to roughly 3,000 
euros in West Germany and 4,800 euros in East Germany. Of course, these numbers are only 
rough approximations. They are sufficiently large, however, to make it reasonable to conclude 
that there is a net gain for the government.
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 Unfortunately, it is not possible to conduct a 
similar cost-benefit analysis for firms because the necessary inputs are unknown. 
[[Table 5.3 (Table 7) near here]] 
<H1>Conclusion 
In this article, we assess the impact of firms’ introduction of phased retirement schemes on 
their employees’ labor market outcomes for Germany. These PWE schemes are available to 
workers aged 55 or older. Grogger and Wunsch (2013) showed that in the absence of 
attractive early retirement options, many older workers in Germany—both voluntarily and 
involuntarily—leave the labor market considerably before statutory retirement age (65) 
through unemployment, during which they claim unemployment insurance benefits. PWE has 
been introduced and supported by government subsidies with the aim of smoothing the 
transition from work to retirement and of decreasing costs in the public pension and 
unemployment insurance schemes through an increase in employment of elderly workers who 
otherwise would have exited prematurely through unemployment or early retirement. There is 
no legal requirement that firms offer PWE to their employees, but they may do so voluntarily.  
Our results suggest that phased retirement options offered by firms can help to reduce 
some of the public costs associated with the premature exit of older workers from the labor 
market, mainly by reducing exits through unemployment. In line with the objectives of PWE, 
we find that its introduction increases employment and labor earnings and reduces unem-
ployment of most older workers, while leaving the time of complete withdrawal from the 
labor market largely unchanged. Hence, the program benefits the government budget in terms 
                                                          
24 It nevertheless needs to be borne in mind that because of our empirical design, we consider a sample 
of firms that potentially differ from companies that had already adopted PWE prior to 2000 in terms of 
factors that could be relevant for the costs and benefits. 
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of increased tax revenue and social insurance contributions as well as reduced unemployment 
insurance payments. A rough cost-benefit analysis suggests average net savings in public 
costs per worker in PWE of about 3,000 to 4,500 euros in West Germany and 4,500 to 7,000 
euros in East Germany. 
There may also be some undesired effects, however. We find evidence that the availa-
bility of PWE encourages some West German but not East German workers to exit the labor 
market earlier than they would without PWE. The main difference between the two parts of 
Germany is that labor market conditions are much more favorable in West than in East 
Germany. East German workers in our sample are more likely to experience interruptions in 
their work career and earn considerably less than West German workers. Hence, for a given 
age on average they have contributed less to the pension system and consequently have lower 
pension claims than their West German counterparts, which makes premature exit from the 
labor market less attractive for them. This suggests that the undesired effects documented by 
Machado and Portela (2012) are more likely when labor market conditions during the work 
life are better and when earnings and accumulated pension claims are higher. This is 
supported indirectly by the literature on the use of phased retirement, which shows higher use 
rates under these circumstances. 
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Table 1. Number of Firms and Male Employees 
 
West East 
Age 31–40 41–50 51–60 31–40 41–50 51–60 
Firms 179 178 176 166 167 171 
Individual
s  4,098 4,269 3,390 4,145 4,894 2,902 
34 
Table 3.2.[[Table 2 ]] Summary of Potential Confounders and Control Variables Available in 
the Data 
Potential confounders Variables available in the data Variables included in the 
estimation 
Firm size Firm size Firm size 
Industry of the firm Industry of the firm Industry of the firm 
Occupation of the 
employees 
Occupation of the employees Occupation of the employees 
Firm performance Revenue, change in revenue 
compared with previous year, 
investments, firm growth, turnover 




and human resource 
policies 
Dozens of variables Indicators for whether firm is 
currently restructuring, 
foreign ownership, single 
branch firm, looking for staff 
in the future, hiring 
skilled/young workers is a 
problem, staff shortage is a 
problem  
Flexible work schedules Working time accounts, job 
sharing, job rotation, share of part-
time workers, employee works 
part-time 
Firm uses working time 
accounts, employee works 
part-time 





Indicators for whether firm has 
works council, is subject to sectoral 
or firm-specific wage contract, 
follows sectoral wage contract, or 
is not subject to a wage contract 
Indicator for whether firm ties 
pay to collective wage 
agreement 
Region and its 
economic situation 
Region dummies, unemployment 
rate, migration, commuting, 
dummies for urban and rural 
areas, population density, GDP 
growth, jobs per inhabitant aged 
15–64, earnings per capita 
Region dummies, rural/urban 
dummies, local 
unemployment rate 





Gender, age, education, 
nationality, part-time/full-time, 
earnings distribution, occupations, 
blue-collar/white-collar job 




Health problems of the 
firm’s workforce 
Firm has problems with high 
absenteeism, share of employment 
contracts in the last 1–10 years 
that ended because of prolonged 
illness of more than six weeks 





Current wage, cumulated earnings 
during past 10 years, firm offers 
profit sharing 
Current wage, cumulated 
earnings during past 10 years 
Corporate pension 
plans 
Industry of the firm, occupation of 
the employees, individual tenure 
and earnings, turnover, 
distribution of tenure and earnings 
in firm 
Industry of the firm, 
occupation of the employees, 
individual tenure and earn-
ings, share of employees 
leaving the firm, mean 
earnings in firm 
Other factors and 
differential trends 
More than 200 variables with half-
yearly measurements of different 
types of employment, 
unemployment, receipt of 
unemployment insurance, wage 
earnings, program participation 
and inactivity; average duration 
and number of spells of employ-
ment/unemployment/program 
participation/inactivity, over the 
last 10 years  
Tenure, cumulated earnings 
during past 10 years, 
unemployed in last 4/10 years, 
out of the labor force in last 
4/10 years, fraction employed 
9 to 10 years before 
 
 
Notes: All variables that are available in the data but are not used in the estimation have been tested in 
omitted variable tests. They are highly correlated with the included variables and therefore do 
not add much explanatory power. 
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Table 3. [[Table 3]]Mean Characteristics of Firms Employing Elderly Male Workers by 
Region 
  West East 
 
PWE Difference PWE Difference 










Basic firm characteristics 
Number of employees 284 354 70 9 252 302 50 0 























Mean age of employees 40 40 0 1 41 40 –1 0 











Mean of monthly earnings in 


































































































































































































        






























































































7   
Notes: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000. None of the differences are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4. [[Table 4]]Mean Characteristics of Elderly Male Workers by Region 
  West East 
 
PWE Difference PWE Difference 










Age 55 55 0 0 56 55 0 0 





































































































































































































7   
Notes: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000. Observations with a non-zero 
value have been excluded for *men in West Germany and **East German workers. None of the 
differences are statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5. [[Table 5]]ATE on Tenure in the Original Establishment in Days (Men) 
Notes: */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
Inference is based on block bootstrapping p-values (clustered at 
the establishment level, 499 replications). Tenure refers to the 
time with the establishment after treatment measured from July 
2004. Tenure before that is a control variable. 
  
Region Age Effect P-value in % 
West 31–40 –91 72 
 
41–50 –147 56 
 
51–60 –40 82 
East 31–40 –101 40 
 
41–50 –106 41 
 
51–60 224 14 
40 
Table 6. [[Table 6]]Inputs for Cost-Benefit Analysis (Men) 
Notes: Deductions for taxes and social insurance contributions 40%, average wages 
of workers in firms with PWE from Table 4, replacement rate for pensions 0.55.  





Difference in cumulated gross earnings 8,009 8,124 
Difference in cumulated net earnings 4,806 4,874 
Difference in months unemployed –4.7 –5.7 
Average monthly unemployment benefits 1,166 893 
Difference in months out of the labor force 1.9 –1.6 
Share not returning to employment after inactivity 
in % 12.0 9.3 
Average monthly pension benefits 1,069 818 
Share in FEA sponsored PWE in %* 18.5 18.5 
Average expenditures on FEA sponsored workers* 12,203 12,203 
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discounting 0.97 0.95 
Region West East West East West East 
Gain in tax revenue and social insurance 

































Descriptive Statistics for Different Samples 
Table A.1 Means of Selected Variables for Different Samples (Men) 
43 












Firm characteristics      
Number of employees 1,406 1,605 699 778 373 
Share of newly hired employees 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.11 
Share of employees leaving the 
firm 
0.14 0.13 0.16 0.13 
0.12 
Mean age of employees 38.7 39.3 39.6 39.9 39.9 
Share of employees 55 or older 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Mean of monthly earnings in euros 2,611 2,654 2,256 2,420 2,305 
Share of female employees 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.26 
Share of employees w/o German 
citizenship 
0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
0.06 
Share of part-time employees 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.06 
Share of apprentices 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Share of unskilled workers 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.25 
Share of skilled workers 0.25 0.26 0.34 0.35 0.36 
Share of clerks 0.36 0.35 0.27 0.28 0.29 
Share of employees without 
vocational degree 
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 
0.17 
Share of employees with 
vocational degree 
0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 
0.70 
Share of college/university 
graduates 
0.11 0.11 0.08 0.09 
0.09 
Manufacturing sector 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.76 
Construction sector 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.02 
Trade/sales/retail sector 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 
Service sector 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.14 
Other sector 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Individual characteristics 
     
Age 39.5 39.6 39.7 44.0 44.8 
No vocational degree 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.11 
Vocational degree 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.70 0.76 
College/university degree 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Share employed in last 10 years 0.80 0.82 0.78 0.92 0.93 
Share unemployed in last 10 years 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Share out of labor force in last 10 
years 
0.17 0.16 0.18 0.07 
0.06 
Gross earnings per month 2,816 2,832 2,367 2,736 2,688 
Unskilled worker 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.23 
Skilled worker 0.29 0.30 0.39 0.43 0.46 
Clerk 0.37 0.36 0.25 0.29 0.30 
Job in engineering 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.32 
Job in construction 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.02 
Job in manufacturing 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.24 
High-skilled job in services 0.28 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.21 
Low-skilled job in services 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.11 
Other job 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.09 
No German citizenship 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 
Number of observations 837,137 602,153 92,320 52,043 23,698 
Percentage of previous sample 100 72 15 56 46 
44 
Notes: (1) All employees of firms observed in the Establishment Panel (EP) for which we have linked 
employer-employee data. (2) Firms not observed in EP 2002 excluded. (3) Firms with PWE in 1999 or 
2000 excluded. (4) Workers aged ≤ 30 or > 60 or with tenure < 3 years or from West Germany with 
share employed in last 10 years < 1 excluded. (5) Firms with > 1000 employees or in other sector or 
that neither have a collective wage agreement nor tie pay to collective agreements or from East 





Probit Specifications for Selection into PWE 
Table B.1. Probit Specifications for Males in West Germany 
46 
Note: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000. 
  
 














Constant –6.984 0.0 –7.211 0.0 –5.948 0.0 
Firm characteristics 
      Log number of employees 0.792 0.0 0.966 0.0 0.902 0.0 
501–1,000 employees -0.503 0.0 –0.818 0.0 –0.697 0.0 
Share of employees 55 or older 2.203 0.0 1.323 0.4 0.233 67.1 
Share of employees leaving the 
firm –1.480 0.0 –1.403 0.0 –0.311 8.1 
Share of unskilled employees –0.387 0.1 –0.366 0.2 0.155 27.4 
Single branch firm 0.326 0.0 0.319 0.0 0.222 0.0 
High number of absences is a 
problem –0.426 0.0 –0.522 0.0 –0.705 0.0 
Staff shortage is problem –0.333 0.0 –0.266 0.0 –0.458 0.0 
No working-time accounts 0.000 99.3 0.192 0.0 0.310 0.0 
Reorganization of corporate 
structure 0.617 0.0 0.615 0.0 0.543 0.0 
Pay tied to collective agreement –0.751 0.0 –0.656 0.0 –0.739 0.0 
Manufacturing industry 0.439 0.0 0.508 0.0 0.564 0.0 
Employee characteristics 
      Age 0.006 49.0 0.001 85.0 0.001 89.1 
No German citizen 0.289 0.1 –0.111 18.3 –0.014 86.8 
University entrance degree 
(Abitur) –0.216 3.4 –0.272 0.2 –0.258 1.1 
No vocational degree 0.041 59.3 0.034 64.6 –0.019 82.7 
Manufacturing occupation 0.226 0.0 0.231 0.0 0.407 0.0 
Service occupation 0.153 3.8 0.025 70.9 0.138 3.5 
Unskilled worker 0.249 0.1 0.383 0.0 0.291 0.1 
Clerk 0.104 20.1 0.196 0.8 0.188 1.3 
Half-monthly earnings in 1000s 
of euros 1.060 0.0 0.923 0.0 0.414 0.1 
Half-monthly earnings > 1,500 
euros[[AU: Confusing. In 
1000s?]] –0.476 0.0 –0.388 0.0 –0.069 47.8 
Tenure 0.059 30.6 0.064 24.1 –0.007 92.3 
Tenure 7 years –0.192 12.9 –0.441 0.0 –0.428 0.8 
Regional characteristics 
      Big agglomeration –0.653 0.0 –0.629 0.0 –0.650 0.0 
Local unemployment rate 0.131 0.0 0.097 0.0 0.080 0.0 
Northern Germany –0.459 0.0 –0.345 0.2 –0.577 0.0 
Central Germany –0.150 0.8 –0.102 7.3 –0.146 3.1 











Table B.2. Probit Specifications for Males in East Germany 
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Constant –3.275 0.0 –1.277 0.7 –2.279 0.1 
Firm characteristics 
      Log number of employees 0.155 0.1 0.029 51.9 0.138 1.1 
Share of employees with 
university or college degree 4.167 0.0 4.554 0.0 3.019 0.0 
Share of employees 55 or older –0.670 13.0 0.033 93.7 1.946 0.0 
No working-time accounts 0.178 0.4 0.280 0.0 0.065 45.5 
Share of employees leaving the 
firm (survey) –7.419 0.0 -9.973 0.0 
–
10.950 0.0 
No reorganization 0.002 97.7 -0.035 59.8 -0.307 0.0 
Looking for staff in future 0.833 0.0 1.071 0.0 1.047 0.0 
Hiring skilled workers is problem 0.365 0.0 0.157 0.9 0.164 3.6 
Hiring young workers is problem –0.525 0.0 –0.472 0.0 –0.863 0.0 
High number of absences is a 
problem 0.671 0.0 0.681 0.0 0.560 0.0 
Foreign-owned to more than 50% –0.491 0.0 –0.551 0.0 –0.930 0.0 
Trade sector 0.964 0.0 1.097 0.0 0.767 0.0 
Service sector –0.531 0.0 –0.518 0.0 –0.633 0.0 
Employee characteristics 
      Age –0.003 71.0 –0.027 0.1 –0.009 37.7 
University entrance degree 
(Abitur) –0.121 48.1 –0.169 21.1 0.232 22.1 
Vocational degree 0.392 0.0 0.139 14.5 0.136 25.3 
University or college degree 0.427 4.8 0.312 6.3 –0.099 68.1 
Technical occupation –0.453 0.0 –0.382 0.0 –0.142 8.8 
Higher-skilled service occupation –0.602 0.0 –0.578 0.0 –0.343 0.1 
Low-skilled service occupation 0.075 44.7 –0.135 13.6 –0.084 45.0 
Other occupation –0.403 0.0 –0.451 0.0 –0.361 0.3 
Skilled worker –0.378 0.0 –0.301 0.0 –0.116 22.3 
Clerk –0.284 0.8 –0.360 0.1 –0.261 4.9 
Half-monthly earnings in euros 1.118 0.0 1.562 0.0 0.265 20.6 
Half-monthly earnings > 1,500 
euros –0.209 8.8 –0.415 0.0 –0.037 76.1 
Cumulated earnings from 
employment in last 10 years –0.131 25.4 –0.298 2.3 0.105 40.7 
Tenure 0.517 0.0 0.523 0.0 0.530 0.0 
Tenure 7 years –0.713 0.0 –0.854 0.0 –0.766 0.0 
Unemployed in last 4 years –0.344 1.0 –0.645 0.0 –0.583 2.6 
Unemployed in last 10 years –0.085 19.5 -0.203 0.2 –0.004 96.8 
Out of the labor force in last 4 
years –0.021 82.4 –0.026 77.4 –0.002 98.8 
Out of the labor force in last 10 
years 0.320 0.0 0.177 0.1 0.113 10.9 
Fraction employed 9–10 years 
before 1.015 0.0 1.014 0.0 1.257 0.0 
Regional characteristics 
      Rural area 0.271 0.0 0.395 0.0 0.390 0.0 






 Efron's R2 0.33 0.36 0.36 
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Table C.1. Loss of Observations Due to Imposition of Common Support 
 
 





All Remaining Excluded All Remaining Excluded 
Basic firm characteristics 
Number of employees 386 377 520 336 339 296 
Share of newly hired employees 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.26 
Share of employees leaving the firm 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.24 
Mean age of employees 40.0 40.0 40.1 40.9 40.8 42.6 
Share of employees 55 or older 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.17 
Mean of monthly earnings in euros 
2,59
3 2,584 2,727 2,032 2,053 1,653 
Share of female employees 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.30 0.30 0.28 
Share of employees w/o German 
citizenship 
0.13 
0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Share of part-time employees 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.14 
Human capital 
Share of apprentices 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 
Share of unskilled workers 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.31 
Share of skilled workers 0.28 0.28 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.24 
Share of clerks 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Share of employees without 
vocational degree 
0.26 
0.27 0.20 0.09 0.09 0.06 
Share of employees with vocational 
degree 
0.63 
0.62 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 
Share of college/university 
graduates 
0.06 
0.06 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.17 
Industry 
Manufacturing 0.80 0.79 1.00 0.69 0.70 0.49 
Construction 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Trade/sales/retail 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Service industry 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.24 0.23 0.44 
 
West East 
Stratum 31–40 41–50 51–60 31–40 41–50 51–60 
All observations 4,098 4,269 3,390 4,145 4,894 2,902 
Percentage 
remaining 93 97 94 87 91 95 
51 
Organization 
Foreign ownership >50% 0.22 0.23 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.01 
No working-time accounts 0.23 0.22 0.40 0.22 0.20 0.44 
Profit sharing 0.21 0.19 0.48 0.12 0.12 0.14 
Pay tied to collective agreement 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.19 0.17 0.38 
Recent reorganization of corporate 
structure 
0.48 
0.45 0.88 0.35 0.36 0.19 
Staff-related issues 
Looking for staff right now 0.64 0.66 0.48 0.36 0.36 0.49 
Hard to find skilled workers 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.48 0.47 0.54 
High rate of absences 0.27 0.28 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.32 
Firm performance 
Firm growth –5.0 –5.5 3.8 0.9 0.0 17.0 
Revenue increased compared with 
last year 
0.49 
0.48 0.62 0.36 0.36 0.46 
Share of capital widening 
investments 
0.29 
0.29 0.29 0.38 0.38 0.26 
. 




All Remaining Excluded All Remaining Excluded 
Regional characteristics 
Firm in city 0.32 0.33 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.28 
Mean unemployment rate 2002 8.39 8.30 9.74 14.33 14.22 16.22 
Individual characteristics 
Age 55.2 55.2 54.9 55.3 55.4 55.1 
No vocational degree 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Vocational degree 0.70 0.70 0.83 0.72 0.72 0.71 
College/university degree 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.21 0.21 0.25 
Share employed in last 10 years 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.86 
Share unemployed in last 10 years* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Share out of labor force in last 10 
years* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.10 
Gross earnings per month 3180 3173 3283 2345 2360 2068 
Unskilled worker 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.15 0.14 0.34 
Skilled worker 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.51 0.53 0.28 
Clerk 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.38 
Job in engineering 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.21 
Job in construction** 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Job in manufacturing 0.22 0.21 0.37 0.19 0.19 0.12 
High-skilled job in services 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.23 
Low-skilled job in services 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.37 
Other job 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.07 
No German citizenship** 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Number of observations 3390 3177 213 2902 2746 156 
52 
Percentage remaining within 
support 94 95 
Notes: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000. Observations with a non-zero 




Further Estimation Results 
Table D.1. Point-in-Time Estimates (Men) 
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Table D.1. Continued 













































































































































































Table E.1. A Matching Protocol for the Estimation of a Counterfactual Outcome and the 
Effects 
Step A-1 Choose one observation in the subsample defined by treatment d=1 and 
delete it from that pool. 
Step B-1 Find an observation in the subsample defined by d=0 that is as close as 
possible to the one chosen in step A-1 in terms of ( ),p x x . “Closeness” is 
based on the Mahalanobis distance.  
Step C-1 Repeat A-1 and B-1 until no observation with d=1 is left. 
Step D-1 Compute the distribution of distances obtained for any comparison between 
a member of the reference distribution and matched comparison 
observations. Obtain the distance at quantile Q (dist). 
Step A-2 Repeat A-1. 
Step B-2 Repeat B-1. If possible, find other observations in the subsample of d=0 that 
are at least as close as R * dist to the one chosen in step A-2. Do not 
remove these observations, so that they can be used again. Compute 
weights for all chosen comparisons observations that are proportional to 
their distance. Normalize the weights such that they add to one. 
Step C-2 Repeat A-2 and B-2 until no participant in d=1 is left. 
Step D-2 For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in A-2 
and B-2. 
Step E Using the weights  obtained in D-2, run a weighted linear regression of 
the outcome variable on the variables used to define the distance (and an 
intercept. 
Step F-1 Predict the potential outcome 
0 ( )iy x  of every observation using the 
coefficients of this regression: 
0ˆ ( )iy x . 
Step F-2 Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for 
0( | 1)E Y D   as: 
0 0
1 1 0
ˆ ˆ( ) (1 ) ( )N i i i i i
i





Step G Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in D-2, compute a 
weighted mean of the outcome variables in d=0. Subtract the bias from this 
estimate to get 
0( | 1)E Y D  . 
 
The parameters used to define the radius for the distance-weighted radius matching are set to 
0.9 for both, R and Q. Q refers to the quantile of the distribution of the distances to the closest 
neighbor in a one-to-one matching. It is defined in terms of the propensity score. Different 
values for R and Q are checked in the sensitivity analysis in Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch 
(2011) as well as in the simulation study by Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013). They 
showed a considerable robustness of the results with respect to the choice of R and Q. 
( )iw x
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